We design experimental games that admit Battaglini's (2002) construction of fully revealing equilibrium in multidimensional cheap talk. Two senders transmit information to a receiver over a 2ˆ2 state space. Despite overall misaligned interests, in equilibrium senders truthfully revealing on distinct dimensions provides each other with incentives to do so. Subjects behaved as prescribed by equilibrium when the ideal actions of each sender and the receiver, though misaligned, shared common dimensional components. Lower adherence was observed when such dimensional alignments of interests were removed for some states. Even in this case, restricting senders' access to messages, under which out-of-equilibrium messages never arise, substantially brought behavior back in line with equilibrium. When out-of-equilibrium messages could not be eliminated and the equilibrium required implausible supporting beliefs, however, restricting message spaces lost its effects. Our findings highlight the role of message space and its limit in facilitating laboratory success of fully revealing equilibrium.
Introduction
A defining hallmark of modern economies is the extensive specialization that occurs in both physical production and the more intangible domain of decision making and information provision. Comparative advantage not only dictates decision makers to delegate knowledge acquisition to experts, but also guides different experts to specialize in giving advice on separate areas. When conflicts of interests are present, strategic considerations may provide yet another reason for decision makers to consult different experts. In seeking advice from an interested advisor on the potential impacts of a bill, a legislator may obtain impartial advice only on certain areas, creating a need for her to consult another advisor who might be forthright in a different manner. In a seminal paper on multidimensional cheap talk, Battaglini (2002) provides an equilibrium argument for a decision maker to listen to equally informed experts on separate dimensions and to ignore even truthful advice by an expert on a dimension not designated by equilibrium.
1
The theory of multidimensional cheap talk contrasts sharply with its unidimensional counterpart. In the canonical model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) , the analysis renders a clear picture, which survives modeling variations within the single-sender-single-dimension environment: unless interests are perfectly aligned between the sender and the receiver, only partial information can be transmitted, the extent of which is decreasing in the sender's bias. 2 The picture changes drastically when one more sender is introduced and the uncertainty becomes multidimensional. In Battaglini's (2002) fully revealing equilibrium in a model with multidimensional (unbounded) state space, the receiver fully identifies the state even when the two senders with different directional preferences are otherwise arbitrarily biased.
The informational properties of equilibria represent only one disparity brought about by the departure from single-sender environment-robustness is another. With one sender, out-ofequilibrium belief arises only after unused messages, which can be disregarded without impact on equilibrium outcomes. With two senders, out-of-equilibrium belief arises when messages convey inconsistent information, bringing with it robustness implications. Battaglini (2002) points out that while fully revealing equilibrium also exists with two senders under unidimensional state space, it requires support of implausible beliefs. 3 Even though in his equilibrium construction for multidimensional state space, the messages, concerning different dimensions, will never convey inconsistent information, Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) point out that out-of-equilibrium belief can still arise if the state space is bounded: after a deviation, the messages may point to a "state" outside the state space. 4 In multidimensional cheap talk with multiple senders, the robustness and plausibility of equilibrium are issues that cannot be sidestepped and have received close attention in the theoretical literature since the pioneering work of Battaglini (2002 In this study, we take on an empirical approach to examine the plausibility of the central idea behind Battaglini's (2002) fully revealing equilibrium. We experiment on a series of simple games that admits his equilibrium construction but otherwise induces different strategic environments. Our design consists of eight games ( Figure 1 ). Game 2, named after the fact that it has two senders, is our pivotal game. Sender 1 (he) and Sender 2 (he) send simultaneous messages to a receiver (she) regarding a 2 (horizontal dimension)ˆ2 (vertical dimension) state space. The receiver chooses among four actions, similarly labeled in dimensional terms. Each sender has available four costless messages framed as non-binding action recommendations. Players' ideal actions differ. Yet, when senders' influences on the receiver are limited to distinct dimensions, horizontal for Sender 1 and vertical for Sender 2, each sender and the receiver share common ranking of the relevant actions. Such preference structure is exploited in a fully revealing equilibrium, which allows the receiver to identify the state despite overall misaligned interests.
The laboratory success of the equilibrium depends on how well three parties coordinate over uses and interpretations of messages. To explore the coordination under varying degrees of strategic uncertainty, we design two other games within the four (two-dimensional) message environment. Game 2-DAL, which induces minimal uncertainty from the senders' side, has in place "dimensional alignments" of interests. In every state, the ideal actions of each sender and the receiver, though overall misaligned, share a common dimensional component. In Game 2, each sender has a distinct state without such dimensional alignment. Game 2-LAB, a relabeling of Game 2, admits fully revealing equilibrium in which Sender 1 reveals, less focally, between the diagonals of the 2ˆ2 state space. We also include one-sender versions of Games 2 and 2-DAL; admitting partially informative equilibria, Games 1 and 1-DAL provide controls for deciphering the influences of a second sender on the strategic interactions.
To control uncertainty surrounding receivers' interpretations of messages, we create Games 2-2/M and 2-LAB-2/M with binary (one-dimensional) message spaces. The restricted message spaces remove receivers' need to interpret inconsistent messages and senders' uncertainty thereon, which is reflected in the theoretical properties that the fully revealing equilibria are free of outof-equilibrium messages and beliefs. The last game in our design, Game 2-2/M-3/S, a three-state version of Game 2-2/M, connects our empirical plausibility inquiry back to the robustness inquiry in the theoretical literature. Inspired by Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) , it has out-of-equilibrium messages reemerged under binary message spaces, messages that point to the eliminated state. The corresponding fully revealing equilibrium is supported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs that are implausible according to the robustness criterion in Battaglini (2002) .
Our experimental findings are divided with respect to the sizes of message spaces. For games with two-dimensional messages, findings from Game 2-DAL provide a benchmark; under dimensional alignments of interests, high adherence to fully revealing equilibrium was observed, in which Sender 1s revealed on dimension H and randomized on dimension V , and vice versa for Sender 2s. Receivers filtered information accordingly, following senders' recommendations selectively on the separate dimensions they revealed, even when messages were inconsistent with each other. Lower adherence was observed in Games 2 and 2-LAB, with no or only slight difference between them despite the latter's less focal revelation dimensions. Senders complied especially less in states without dimensional alignment, and receivers commensurately followed recommendations less often, notably mainly to inconsistent messages that might have been sent as a result of deviations. Overall, receivers identified true states more often with two senders than with one sender. Interestingly, observed behavior in Games 1 and 1-DAL reflected the different forms of partially revealing equilibria found in them.
Findings from one-dimensional message games showed drastically higher adherence. With each sender restrained to recommend only on one dimension, which eliminated occurrence of inconsistent messages, receivers in Games 2-2/M and 2-LAB-2/M virtually always followed recommendations. Senders in turn followed the prescriptions of fully revealing equilibrium significantly more often. The power of restricting message spaces in fostering equilibrium behavior was especially highlighted by senders' adherence in states without dimensional alignment, in which a sharp contrast with the two-dimensional message games was observed. Lower adherence resurfaced in Game 2-2/M-3/S even under restricted message spaces. After messages that indicated deviation had occurred, receivers took the plausible responses that in theory do not support the equilibrium. The finding connected theoretical implausibility with empirical implausibility.
Our experimental results indicate that, in transitioning from theoretical construction to laboratory implementations, the fully revealing equilibrium requires the aid of message spaces. Restricting message spaces, which in theory ensures that out-of-equilibrium beliefs will never arise, helps narrow the range of subjects' anticipations of others' behavior by reducing strategic uncertainty surrounding how messages may be interpreted. Message spaces, however, only facilitated but not compelled adherence to equilibrium, and it was the strategic incentives harnessed by messages spaces that were at work; when receivers' plausible responses invited deviations as reflected in the non-robust nature of the equilibrium, restricting message spaces lost its effects. Blume et al. (2008) also document that restricting message spaces expedites convergence in single-sender games with a priori meaningless messages. Our findings demonstrate the effects of message spaces when the challenge for communication originates not from absence of literal meanings but from how two exogenously meaningful messages are reconciled and interpreted.
Until recently, the experimental literature of communication games has focused on one sender and one receiver. 6 As the first experimental study that moves away from this on the receiver's side, Battaglini and Makarov (2011) design an experiment to test the prediction of Farrell and Gibbons (1989) . In a study in political science, Minozzi and Woon (2011) also examine games with two senders, but in a single dimensional environment where senders' bias is private information. An independent study that is also motivated by Battaglini (2002) is Vespa and Wilson (2012) . Their design represents the dimensions of state space with circles. The larger state space design complements our simple design by considering a richer environment; our simple design complements theirs by informing whether certain complementary, non-compliance findings they obtained were not due to the complexity of the design. Our differences also reflect our different emphases; they adopt the circular design to avoid consideration of out-of-equilibrium beliefs, whereas part of our design is to address how the presence and absence of out-of-equilibrium beliefs affect laboratory behavior. The emphasis on message spaces is also unique to us. They find that whether information transmission takes place as predicted depends on receivers' ability to identify trustworthy source, and enlist level-k reasoning and analogy-based expectation to analyze non-compliance. 7 Their findings complement ours on receivers' different responses to messages depending on whether they might have come from deviations.
Section 2 presents our experimental games and analyze their equilibria. Section 3 formulates experimental hypotheses and describes the experimental procedures. Section 4 reports our findings. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to Appendix A. Appendix B contains a sample of (translated) experimental instructions and Appendix C additional figures and tables. (Appendix D, not intended for publication, contains the original instructions in Chinese.)
2 Two-Dimensional Cheap-Talk Games
The Basic Game Structure
In all but one of our games, uncertainty is represented by a discrete state of the world with two dimensional components, each being a binary variable: pH, V q P tL, RuˆtU, Du. 8 The common priors are that the four states are equally likely. Players are a receiver and one or two senders.
In the two-sender games, after observing the state, Sender i, i " 1, 2, sends a cheap-talk message, m P M i , to the receiver. 9 Messages are sent simultaneously, after which the receiver takes an action a P A " ta LU , a RU , a LD , a RD u. A behavioral strategy of Sender i is σ i : tL, Rut U, Du Ñ ∆M i and that of the receiver is ρ : M 1ˆM2 Ñ ∆A. The receiver's belief function is µ : M 1ˆM2 Ñ ∆ptL, RuˆtU, Duq. Payoffs are determined by state and action. The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where strategies are optimal given beliefs and beliefs are derived from Bayes' rule whenever possible.
Battaglini's (2002) equilibrium construction leverages on the common interests shared between senders and receiver in a lower dimension, even though in a higher dimension interests are misaligned. Table 1 presents an example of preference orders that carry such property in our environment. Players' ideal actions do not coincide; in state pH, V q, the ideal action of the receiver 7 See Crawford (2003) for pioneering theoretical work on applying level-k reasoning to communication games. Analogy-based expectation equilibrium is developed by Jehiel (2005) , and Jehiel and Koessler (2008) apply the alternative equilibrium concept to analyze communication in Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model. 8 Our design is shaped by two considerations: to create an environment as simple as possible that is conducive to subjects' comprehension of the problem (Binmore, 1999) and to capture the essence of Battaglini's (2002) equilibrium construction. The simplification necessarily entails discrepancies with Battaglini (2002) . For instance, while "dimension" in his paper refers to the dimension of a vector space (the two-dimensional Euclidean state space), we use the term to refer to the components of our discrete state. 9 Theoretically, the size of the message spaces has no significance so long as it does not constrain the set of equilibrium outcomes. This will be the case for, for example, binary and quadruple message spaces, which will be covered in our experimental design. 
is a HV , but a HV is the second most preferred action of the senders. Despite such misaligned interests, full revelation is possible in equilibrium. The following rankings of actions implied by the preference orders in Table 1 are relevant for constructing a fully revealing equilibrium:
1. Sender 1 and the receiver:
(a) Fixing V " U , both prefer a LU to a RU when H " L and a RU to a LU when H " R.
(b) Fixing V " D, both prefer a LD to a RD when H " L and a RD to a LD when H " R.
Sender 2 and the receiver:
(a) Fixing H " L, both prefer a LU to a LD when V " U and a LD to a LU when V " D.
(b) Fixing H " R, both prefer a RU to a RD when V " U and a RD to a RU when V " D.
To illustrate how these conditionally aligned interests can be exploited for full revelation, suppose that pL, Dq is realized and Sender 1 truthfully reveals (only) that H " L (and the receiver believes him). This makes Sender 2's ideal action, a RD , out of reach, forcing him to choose between a LU and a LD , the respective actions that the receiver will take when she believes that the state is most likely pL, U q and pL, Dq. Since Sender 2 prefers a LD to a LU in state pL, Dq, he will prefer to tell that V " D. And given that Sender 2 truthfully reveals that V " D, Sender 1 will also, by a similar argument, prefer to tell that H " L. The true state pL, Dq is thus revealed to the receiver. In effect, a sender truthfully reveals on a dimension to help align the interests of the other sender with the receiver's.
Five Games with Two-Dimensional Messages
We induce the above environment and its variants for experimentations. In this subsection, we describe and analyze games with two-dimensional messages, where a sender's message space contains four elements. Action labels (left, up) for a LU , (right, up) for a RU , (left, down) for a LD , and (right, down) for a RD were used in the experiments; from now on we use ph, vq to denote a generic action. We assign literal meaning to messages in accordance with the action labels, and the information transmission problem is framed as sender(s) providing action recommendations. Sender i's message space is: M i " t"ph, vq"|"pleft, upq", "pright, upq", "pleft, downq", "pright, downq"u. Five out of our eight games fall under this category: the single-sender Games 1 and 1-DAL, and the two-sender Games 2, 2-LAB and 2-DAL. Figure 2 depicts We analyze the most informative equilibria of the games. In the single-sender games, partitional information is transmitted: Proposition 1. There exists a partially revealing equilibrium in Game 1 in which the single sender truthfully reveals pL, U q only. The corresponding information partition, ttpL, U qu, tpR, U q, pR, Dq, pL, Dquu, is the unique informative equilibrium partition. There exists a partially revealing equilibrium in Game 1-DAL in which the single sender truthfully reveals only on dimension H. The corresponding information partition, ttpL, U q, pL, Dqu, tpR, U q, pR, Dquu, is the unique informative equilibrium partition.
While informative partitions are unique, the two games each has a continuum of equilibrium outcomes, depending on how the receiver randomizes over actions in response to the coarse information.
13 As cheap-talk games, there is also the inessential multiplicity of equilibria with different uses of messages supporting a given equilibrium outcome.
We proceed to the two-sender games, where the most informative equilibria are fully revealing. We say that a sender truthfully reveals on dimension H (V ) if he reveals whether the state consists 11 The game naming convention is that the number, 1 or 2, indicates the number of sender(s) and any suffix represents a manipulation relative to Game 2 or its derivative.
12 The receiver's payoffs are also slightly different. Given receiver's ideal action ph˚, v˚q, in Game 2-DAL, ph 1 , v˚q and ph˚, v 1 q, h 1 ‰ h˚, v 1 ‰ v˚, yield a payoff of zero, whereas ph 1 , v 1 q yields 20; in Game 2, ph 1 , v 1 q yields 0, whereas ph 1 , v˚q and ph˚, v 1 q yield 20 or 10. As will be shown below, the purpose of the differences is to obtain different equilibrium strategies for Sender 1's incarnations in the corresponding one-sender games. Note also that in Game 2-LAB, the appropriately redefined "diagonal alignment" is in place for Sender 1 in all states except pR, Dq, and for Sender 2 the dimensional alignment profile remains the same as that in Game 2.
13 For the equilibrium outcomes in Game 1, the receiver takes (left, up) in pL, U q and randomizes in the other three states between (right, up) and (right, down) with arbitrary probabilities, leaving out the strictly dominated (left, down). For Game 1-DAL, the receiver randomizes between (left, up) and (left, down) in pL, U q and pL, Dq, and between (right, up) and (right, down) in pR, U q and pR, Dq, both with arbitrary probabilities.
of L or R (U or D); a sender is said to truthfully reveal between the diagonals if he reveals whether the state is in the major diagonal tpL, U q, pR, Dqu or in the minor tpR, U q, pL, Dqu. We group all fully revealing equilibria with same information partition provided by each sender into a class; equilibria within a class thus differ only by different uses of messages to induce the unique information partitions. Proposition 2. There exists a fully revealing equilibrium in Games 2, 2-LAB, and 2-DAL.
Between Games 2 and 2-LAB, 1 . there is a class of fully revealing equilibria unique to Game 2, in which Sender 1 truthfully reveals only on dimension H and Sender 2 only on dimension V ;
2. there is a class of fully revealing equilibria unique to Game 2-LAB, in which Sender 1 truthfully reveals only between the diagonals and Sender 2 only on dimension V ; and,
3
. there is a class of fully revealing equilibria common to both games, in which both Sender 1 and Sender 2 truthfully reveal all four states.
All three classes of equilibria exist in Game 2-DAL, with another class unique to Game 2-DAL in which Sender 1 truthfully reveals only on dimension H and Sender 2 only between the diagonals.
The rationale behind the fully revealing equilibria in Game 2 follows from the discussion in Section 2.1. The equilibrium-relevant dimension is H for Sender 1 and V for Sender 2. The relabeling in Game 2-LAB effectively interchanges states pL, Dq and pR, Dq for Sender 1's revelation in the characteristic equilibrium. In Game 2-DAL, under all-state dimensional alignments and the fact that the receiver's ideal actions are the senders' second most preferred, the game admits equilibria not only with dimensional revelation but also with diagonal revelations.
14
Other than equilibrium properties, strategic uncertainty will also inform our experimental hypotheses. For the dimensionally revealing equilibrium in Game 2-DAL, the all-state dimensional alignments, which are in agreement with the equilibrium-relevant dimensions, create some sort of "dominance." Conditioned on the receiver following the other sender's recommendation on the relevant dimension, regardless of whether it is truthful or not, a sender always prefers to truthfully reveal on his own dimension. No such property exists for the diagonally revealing equilibria; there exists a state in which a sender prefers to deviate from truthful revelation unless he believes that the other sender truthfully reveals with probability 2 3 or above. Similarly, a 14 The classes of fully revealing equilibria in Proposition 2 are meant to be representative but not exhaustive. There exist fully revealing equilibria with hybrid strategy profile in which, for example, Sender 1 truthfully reveals all four states and Sender 2 only on dimension V . For expositional convenience, from now on we use "equilibrium" unless the plural form is called for to convey specific points.
belief of at least 9 13 is required for the equilibria in Games 2 and 2-LAB. In terms of less strategic uncertainty from the senders' side, the dimensionally revealing equilibrium in Game 2-DAL thus dominates not only the alternative diagonally revealing equilibrium, but also the equilibria in Games 2 and 2-LAB.
To set the stage for introducing additional games, we comment on the types of out-ofequilibrium messages in the two-sender games. In the equilibria in which each sender reveals all four states, out-of-equilibrium messages arise as inconsistent message pairs. In such equilibria, the receiver expects to receive messages that indicate the same pH, V q. Out-of-equilibrium messages therefore arise when a message pair that indicates different entries for H, V , or both are received. For the equilibria with dimensional/diagonal revelations, the only out-of-equilibrium messages that may arise are unused messages. Since each sender reveals only a binary characteristic of the state, two messages suffice for each to separate, leaving other two messages potentially unused. Unused messages are, however, trivial in cheap-talk games; one can have all messages used by prescribing the senders to randomize. Without any out-of-equilibrium messages, inconsistent or unused, a fully revealing equilibrium where senders randomize on nonequilibrium-relevant dimensions is free of out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Three Games with One-Dimensional/Diagonal Messages
We restrict the message spaces in Games 2 and 2-LAB, creating Games 2-2/M and 2-LAB-2/M. Both games have binary message spaces. For Game 2-2/M, they are M 1 " t"h"|"left", "right"u and M 2 " t"v"|"up", "down"u. For Game 2-LAB-2/M, Sender 1's message space is replaced by M 1 " t"ph, vq or ph 1 , v 1 q"|"(left, up) or (right, down)", "(right, up) or (left, down)"u. We turn to the equilibria:
There exists a unique class of fully revealing equilibria in Game 2-2/M in which Sender 1 truthfully reveals on dimension H and Sender 2 on dimension V . There exists a unique class of fully revealing equilibria in Game 2-LAB-2/M in which Sender 1 truthfully reveals between the diagonals and Sender 2 on dimension V . Any fully revealing equilibrium in the two games is free of out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Restricting message spaces serves two experimental purposes. It eliminates receiver's need to interpret inconsistent messages and thus minimizes strategic uncertainty thereon. It also serves as a step toward controlling the scenarios in which out-of-equilibrium belief arise by first eliminating them.
We introduce our last game in which out-of-equilibrium belief arises under specific scenarios that can be readily identified in the laboratory. Leveraging on Ambrus and Takahashi's (2008) insight on the cause of out-of-equilibrium messages under a restricted state space, we eliminate state pR, Dq in Game 2-2/M, adjusting the prior so that the remaining three states are equally likely. The result is Game 2-2/M-3/S ( Figure 3 ). Fully revealing equilibrium also exists in Game 2-2/M-3/S, but now out-of-equilibrium belief, which can arise even under the binary message spaces, plays a crucial role. Consider a deviation by Sender 2 when the state is pR, U q. In Game 2-2/M, the receiver, being told by the equilibrium-abided Sender 1 that the state consists of R and by the deviating Sender 2 that it consists of D, cannot detect the deviation. She will take action (right, down) as when pR, Dq is truthfully revealed in equilibrium. A deviation does not lead to the receipt of out-of-equilibrium messages because every possible message pair is expected in equilibrium. What deters Sender 2 from deviating is the fact that, in state pR, U q, action (right, down) is not as attractive as the equilibrium (right, up).
In Game 2-2/M-3/S, the same deviation creates an entirely different scenario. Given that pR, Dq no longer exists, the receiver can detect that there is a deviation because under no circumstance will she receive such a message pair in equilibrium. The deviation does lead to the receipt of out-of-equilibrium messages. To register a difference from inconsistent message pairs, we call these out-of-equilibrium messages arisen due to restricted state space irreconcilable message pairs. The following proposition states the beliefs required to support the equilibrium: Proposition 4. There exists a unique class of fully revealing equilibria in Game 2-2/M-3/S in which Sender 1 truthfully reveals on dimension H and Sender 2 on dimension V . Any fully revealing equilibrium is supported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs that induce the receiver to take action (left, up) with probability at least 4 5 after an irreconcilable message pair.
With pR, Dq omitted, action (right, down), which can otherwise deter deviations, is strictly dominated for the receiver. Accordingly, (left, up), undominated to receiver and second least preferred to senders' in pR, U q and pL, Dq, assumes the task of supporting the equilibrium.
Robustness Analysis
We analyze the robustness of the fully revealing equilibria in all two-sender games. Using Battaglini's (2002) criterion, we define for each game a corresponding ε-perturbed game: with independent probability ε i Sender i's observation of the state is subject to mistake, in which he observes a random state drawn from a probability distribution, g i , that puts positive probability on all possible states. The resulting definition of robust equilibrium is:
Definition 1 (Battaglini, 2002 ). An equilibrium is robust if there exists a pair of probability distributions pg 1 , g 2 q and a sequence ε n " pε n 1 , ε n 2 q converging to zero such that out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the equilibrium are the limit of the beliefs that the equilibrium strategies would induce in an ε-perturbed game as ε n Ñ 0.
We first apply the criterion to Game 2-2/M-3/S:
None of the fully revealing equilibria in Game 2-2/M-3/S is robust.
Consider an equilibrium in which "left" and "right" are used by Sender 1 to reveal L and R and "up" and "down" by Sender 2 to reveal U and D. In this equilibrium, ("right", "down") is the irreconcilable, out-of-equilibrium message pair. In an ε-perturbed game, the receiver considers to have received the message pair after at least one sender's observation of the state was erroneous. When ε is small, the event that both senders' observations of the state were erroneous is irrelevant; the receiver believes that one of the messages, "right" or "down", conveys information, and in the limit assigns zero probability to pL, U q. In the original, unperturbed Game 2-2/M-3/S, the out-of-equilibrium belief required to support the fully revealing equilibrium has to, however, put positive probability on pL, U q. The consistent belief requirement in Battaglini's (2002) criterion thus rules the equilibrium as non-robust.
In the games with two-dimensional messages, a fully revealing equilibrium with senders babbling by means of randomization is free of out-of-equilibrium beliefs, which makes the equilibrium necessarily robust. However, one can also construct non-robust equilibria, such as one where both senders truthfully reveal all four states. 15 We thus have:
Corollary 2. Some, but not all, fully revealing equilibria in Games 2, 2-LAB, and 2-DAL are robust.
In contrast, given that any fully revealing equilibrium in four-state games with binary messages is free of out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the robustness criterion is trivially satisfied: Corollary 3. All fully revealing equilibria in Games 2-2/M and 2-LAB-2/M are robust.
We conclude by explaining our choice of robustness criterion. Battaglini's (2002) use of perturbed state observations to impose restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs parallels the consistency requirement of sequential equilibrium, where trembles are introduced at the strategy level. However, the overarching mistake probability for all states renders Battaglini's (2002) criterion stronger than sequential equilibrium, at least for our games. Unless we also require the sequence of completely-mixed behavioral strategies to converge to the equilibrium strategies in identical or comparable rates across states, the fully revealing equilibrium in Game 2-2/M-3/S is sequential. Thus, even though our games are finite, using Battaglini's (2002) criterion originally devised for a game with infinite actions allows us to highlight the implausible aspect of the equilibrium in Game 2-2/M-3/S when sequential equilibrium per se has no bite. 16 Table 2 summarizes the properties of the eight games, which constitute our experimental treatments. We hypothesize on how the treatment variables affect information revelation outcomes, i.e., how often receivers identify true states. The hypothesized effects are guided by equilibrium and other properties of the games. We first compare between games in which number of sender is the only treatment variable, informed by Propositions 1 and 2: Hypothesis 1. Receivers in Game 2 (2-DAL) identify true states more often than do receivers in Game 1 (1-DAL).
Experimental Hypotheses and Procedures

Treatments and Hypotheses
Our second hypothesis addresses the treatment effects of dimensional alignments and relabeling. We deviate from pure (fully revealing) equilibrium consideration, which predicts no outcome Note: "All-State Dim. Align." refers to whether each sender's ideal action and the receiver's share common dimensional component in all states. "Out-of-Equilibrium Messages" refer to the possible number of out-of-equilibrium messages per sender in any most informative equilibrium. "Dimensions" refer to the equilibrium-relevant dimensions of Sender 1 and Sender 2; "Multiple" means a sender revealing between the diagonals or on dimension H{V are both consistent with equilibrium. "Robust" refers to whether the fully revealing equilibria are robust or not according to Definition 1.
difference among Games 2, 2-DAL, and 2-LAB. Our comparison between Games 2 and 2-DAL is first informed by the implicit hypothesis that within Game 2-DAL the diagonally revealing equilibria surrender to the dimensionally revealing equilibrium under the latter's minimal strategic uncertainty; the same minimal uncertainty in turn serves to inform that the dimensionally revealing equilibrium in Game 2-DAL outperforms the equilibrium in Game 2 as more empirically plausible. For Games 2 and 2-LAB, we hypothesize that, despite comparable degrees of strategic uncertainty from the senders' side, the diagonally revealing equilibrium in Game 2-LAB is nevertheless less focal than the dimensionally revealing equilibrium in Game 2. We thus have:
Hypothesis 2a. Receivers in Game 2-DAL identify true states more often than do receivers in Game 2.
Hypothesis 2b. Receivers in Game 2-LAB (2-LAB-2/M) identify true states less often than do receivers in Game 2 (2-2/M).
We next compare between games in which message spaces are the only treatment variable. Fully revealing equilibrium again predicts no difference in revelation outcomes between Games 2 (2-LAB) and 2-2/M (2-LAB-2/M). Yet, under the binary message spaces, the equilibria in the latter set of games are free of out-of-equilibrium beliefs and thus robust, while there exist equilibrium in the former that is not. This differentiation informs our next hypothesis: Finally, we compare between Games 2-2/M and 2-2/M-3/S, in which number of states is the only treatment variable. The robustness analysis again informs our hypothesis. In Game 2-2/M-3/S, each sender has a distinct state to unilaterally effect out-of-equilibrium, irreconcilable messages. To deter deviations, however, the receiver has to virtually believe that both senders have deviated. Such "implausible" belief, reflected formally in the non-robust equilibrium, suggests that responses that invite deviation are more plausible. In translating theoretical (im)plausibility to empirical (im)plausibility, we hypothesize that a plausible response is also a likely response, predicting a lower adherence to fully revealing equilibrium in Game 2-2/M-3/S: Hypothesis 4. Receivers in Game 2-2/M-3/S identify true state less often than do receivers in Game 2-2/M.
Procedures
The experiments were conducted in Chinese using z-Tree (Fishchbacher, 2007) at the Taiwan Social Sciences Experimental Laboratory (TASSEL) of National Taiwan University. Four sessions were conducted for each game using a between-subject design. Each session involved five to seven groups of three (two-sender games) or five to nine groups of two (one-sender games), with 492 subjects participated in 32 sessions. Eight sessions were conducted in May 2011 and 24 sessions between June 2012 and January 2013. 17 Subjects had no prior experience in our experiments and were recruited from the undergraduate/graduate student population of the university.
Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects were instructed to sit at separate computer terminals. Each was given a copy of the experimental instructions. To strive for inducing the instructions as common knowledge, they were read aloud, supplemented by slide illustrations. In each session, subjects first participated in three rounds of practice and then 50 official rounds. A random matching protocol with fixed roles was used (repeating partners were allowed).
We illustrate the instructions for two-sender games with two-dimensional messages. Subjects formed groups of three: Member A (Sender 1), Member B (Sender 2), and Member C (receiver). The roles were randomly assigned at the beginning of a session and maintained throughout. At the beginning of each round, the computer would randomly draw one of pL, U q, pR, U q, pL, Dq or pR, Dq. The draws were independent across groups and rounds. The drawn outcome would be revealed on the screens of Member A and Member B; they then privately input their recommendation for Member C. Each sender's recommendation was input in two steps. Member A input "left"/"right" first, followed by "up"/"down". The opposite order was used for Member B. After the recommendation, each sender would be asked to make a point prediction about the other's recommendation. The belief elicitation was mildly incentivized with two payoff points for a correct prediction of each dimensional component of the other's recommendation.
18
The four recommendation inputs, two by each sender, were then revealed to Member C in one step. Member C's screen would show, for example, that "Member A recommends left; Member A recommends up; Member B recommends right; Member B recommends up." Member C then concluded the round by choosing (left, up), (right, up), (left, down) or (right, down). In every decision step, the corresponding payoff profiles in Figure 2 were shown on each subject's screen. 19 At the end of each round, subjects were provided with the current round history (the draw, Members A's and B's recommendations, Member C's action, and subject's own payoff).
At the end of the last round, all members were asked to make a point prediction of the state when recommendations "(right, up)" was received from Member A and "(left, down)" from Member B. These pre-specified messages for prediction were made known to them only at this time. We randomly drew one instance among all groups in the last 30 rounds when these recommendations were observed and rewarded 100 payoff points to subjects with correct prediction.
20
Ten payoff points converted into a real payment of NT$5. A subject was paid his or her sum of rewards from all 50 rounds, including the payoff points from making predictions, plus a NT$100 show-up fee. Subjects earned on average NT$801.78 («US$28.06), ranging from NT$435 («US$15.23) to NT$1,360 («US$47.60). Result 1 (Outcomes).
Experimental Findings
• Positive Effect of Additional Sender: Receivers in Game 2 (2-DAL) identified true states significantly more often than did receivers in Game 1 (1-DAL).
• Positive Effect of Dimensional Alignments: Receivers in Game 2-DAL identified true states significantly more often than did receivers in Game 2.
• No Effect of Focality of Revelation Dimensions: Receivers in Game 2-LAB identified true states as often as did receivers in Game 2. 
Proportion
Round
Frequencies of State-Action Agreements Figure 4 (a) presents the frequencies of state-action agreements, with which we measure how often receivers identified true states by recording instances in which their ideal actions were taken. The frequency aggregated across last 30 rounds of all sessions was 48% (73%) in Game 2 (2-DAL), significantly higher than the 39% (45%) in Game 1 (1-DAL), confirming Hypothesis 1 (p ď 0.0147, Mann-Whitney tests). 21 All were significantly higher than 25% (p " 0.0625, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests), the benchmark for no information transmission with ideal actions taken out of random guess. 22 Information transmission facilitated receivers' identifications of true states and, to varying degrees with respect to dimensional alignments, two senders served better than one.
The frequency in Game 2-DAL was in turn significantly higher than that in Game 2, confirming Hypothesis 2a (p ď 0.0571, Mann-Whitney tests). There was, however, no significant difference between Games 2 and 2-LAB, rejecting Hypothesis 2b (two-sided p " 0.4857, MannWhitney test). Figure 4 (b) breakdowns the frequencies for each state. Between Games 2 and 2-DAL, dimensional alignments improved revelation outcomes through, naturally, pL, Dq and pR, U q, in which no alignment is in place for, respectively, Sender 1 and Sender 2 in Game 2, although "positive spillover" to other states was also observed, especially for pR, Dq. The less focal revelation dimensions in Game 2-LAB did not, however, adversely affect revelation outcomes, although compared to Game 2 lower degree of convergence was observed.
23
For Games 1 and 2, the more frequent state-action agreements in the two-sender game originated from pL, Dq and pR, Dq. On the other hand, for Games 1-DAL and 2-DAL, the more frequent agreements in the latter were observed throughout all states. The qualitative nature of such "difference-in-difference" suggests that the addition of Sender 2 influenced behavior differently with or without all-state dimensional alignments, which is in line with the fact that the equilibrium strategy of the single-sender is different between Games 1 and 1-DAL.
Result 1a (Strategies in Two-Sender Games).
• Senders in two-sender games with two-dimensional messages, Games 2, 2-DAL, and 2-LAB, revealed on their equilibrium-relevant dimensions and randomized on the other, except for the states without dimensional alignment in Games 2 and 2-LAB.
• Receivers in Game 2-DAL followed recommendations according to equilibrium-relevant dimensions. Receivers in Games 2 and 2-LAB followed less often for messages that might have come from states without dimensional alignment, unless two senders recommended the same. 22 All our statistical tests use aggregate data from last 30 rounds of each session as an independent observation. Further convergence in varying degrees across games, which deepens the comparisons in favor of our hypotheses, was typically observed after the 30th round. (In Game 2, for example, the agreement frequency in the last 10 rounds was 10% higher at 58%.) The 30-round cutoff, though rather arbitrary, is adopted with a view to balancing conservativeness with convergence. Table 4 in Appendix C contains statistics under three different aggregations (first 20, last 30, and last 10 rounds). From now on, all frequencies reported and referred to are from last 30 rounds. We consider a difference as statistically significant if and only if one-sided p ď 0.0571 for the Mann-Whitney test and p " 0.0625 (the lowest possible for four observations) for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 23 The state-action agreement frequencies in the last 10 rounds indicate further convergence in Game 2 (58%) but not in Game 2-LAB (46%), with the former significantly higher (p " 0.0143, Mann-Whitney test). Our noeffect conclusion rejecting Hypothesis 2b is drawn in adherence to the criterion of last 30 round data commonly applied to all other comparisons. 24 Consider message uses in pL, U q, a representative state with dimensional alignment. Messages "(left, up)" and "(left, down)" constituted 85% or more of Sender 1s' messages in Games 2 (44% and 45%) and 2-DAL (39% and 46%); "(left, up)" and "(right, down)" constituted 77% of Sender 1s' messages in Game 2-LAB (38% and 39%). For Sender 2s' messages, "(left, up)" and "(right, up)" were used at least 78% of the time in Games 2 (35% and 45%), 2-DAL (45% and 47%), and 2-LAB (37% and 41%). Senders' behavior in states with dimensional alignments was consistent with the prescriptions of fully revealing equilibrium, in which, using the literal recommendations, they revealed only on their equilibrium-relevant dimensions, including the diagonals in Game 2-LAB.
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Different behavioral patterns were observed in states without dimensional alignment. The three most frequently used messages were truthful recommendation and two messages that deviate from equilibrium-relevant dimensions in light of literal meanings and message uses in states with alignments. In Game 2, for instance, Sender 1s' messages in pL, Dq concentrate on "(left, 24 Figure 13 (a) in Appendix C presents Sender 2s' message uses. For Game 2-LAB in Figure 5 (b), "main diagonal" refers to either "(left, up)" or "(right, down)" and "minor diagonal" to "(right, up)" or "(left, down)". 25 Corresponding to the fact that meanings in cheap-talk games are determined in equilibrium, it is the observed uses of messages that determine how meanings should be assigned in our findings. As an anchoring point of interpreting observed behavior, we nevertheless presume that subjects transmit information using the literal meanings of recommendations, in which "recommend ph, vq" is considered to mean "it is in your best interest to take ph, vq." Deviations are interpreted accordingly. down)", "(right, up)", and "(right, down)" (26%, 47%, and 20%). Consider the most frequent "(right, up)", which is recommendation for Sender 1's own ideal action. 26 With Sender 2s' messages concentrated on "(left, down)" and "(right, down)" (43% and 45%) in pL, Dq, which was accurately anticipated by Sender 1s, Sender 1s' self-serving recommendation induced ("(right, up)","(left, down)") or ("(right, up)","(right, down)"). 27 Whether Sender 1s' deviation prompting for own ideal action would be rewarded or punished depended on how receivers would interpret these inconsistent messages. Had receivers sorted them through by following "right" from Sender 1s and "down" from Sender 2s, as was frequently observed in Game 2-DAL (86%), the deviation would have been confronted with a severe punishment of zero payoff. In Game 2, however, receivers responded to ("(right, . )","( . , down)") with "(right, down)" not as often (53%). In return, for the two particular inconsistent message pairs, ("(right, up)","(left, down)") and ("(right, up)","(right, down)"), receivers' responses put substantial frequencies on Sender 1's ideal (right, up) (33%) after one, and on the harmless (left, down) (47%) after the other (Table 3 ). Despite incongruence with the prescriptions of fully revealing equilibrium, senders' behavior in states without dimensional alignment reflected receivers' less severely punishing and at times rewarding responses to inconsistent messages. 26 Similar patterns were observed in other states without alignment. Messages "(right, down)", "(right, up)", and "(left, down)" constituted 88% of Sender 1s' messages in pR, Dq in Game 2-LAB. For Sender 2s in pR, U q, "(right, up)", "(left, down)", and "(right, down)" constituted 88% of messages in Game 2 and 89% in Game 2-LAB. In each case, the most frequent messages were recommendations of the senders' own ideal actions. 27 Sender 1s' predicted frequencies of Sender 2s' messages in pL, Dq were 55% for "(left, down)" and 41% for "(right, down)". Overall, senders' prediction of the other senders' messages was consistent with actual message uses. Figure 14 (a) in Appendix C presents the predictions in Games 2 and 2-LAB. 28 The other less frequent message that deviates from equilibrium-relevant dimension, "(right, down)", induced
It was not just for ("(right, . )","( . , down)"); receivers in Game 2-DAL in general took ph, vq with frequencies at least 75% when ("(h, .)","(. , v)") were received, even when the two messages are totally inconsistent. Subjects in Game 2-DAL exhibited sophistication in filtering information in message pairs according to senders' equilibrium-relevant dimensions, consistent theoretically with the equilibrium construction and empirically with actual message uses.
With senders' deviations in states without alignments, receivers in Games 2 and 2-LAB behaved differently from those in Game 2-DAL. Receivers' responses in Game 2 when (right, up) was received from Sender 1s provide a representative example. Receivers took (right, up) with 29% frequency if "(left, up)" was received from Sender 2s; (right, down) with 52% frequency if "(left, down)" was received from Sender 2s; (right, down) with 43% frequency if "(right, down)" was received from Sender 2s; and "(right, up)" with frequency 92% if "(right, up)" was also received from Sender 2s. By contrast, when cases in ("(left, . )", "( . , up)") were received, (left, up) was taken with 83%´100% frequencies. Such observed behavior can be organized by a response rule in which messages are filtered in two different ways: receivers followed senders on equilibrium-relevant dimensions when no message that might have come from states without alignment was received; when one was received, receivers followed the relevant dimensions less often unless the message was endorsed by an identical message from the other sender.
In the two-dimensional message environment, how receivers responded to inconsistent messages was crucial to the laboratory success of fully revealing equilibrium. In Game 2-DAL, the all-state dimensional alignments presented receivers with minimal strategic uncertainty on how to interpret inconsistent messages, which in turn fostered senders' adherence to reveal according to the equilibrium-relevant dimensions. In Games 2 and 2-LAB, where senders' ideal actions lie across equilibrium-relevant dimensions in states without alignments, receivers were not as predictable with inconsistent messages, which in turn made deviations more justifiable. As will be covered in Section 4.2, restricting senders' access to messages, which eliminates occurrences of inconsistent messages, significantly brought their behavior back in line with the prescriptions of fully revealing equilibrium, notably even for states without dimensional alignment. a mixture of higher rewards and more severe punishments. Overall, the three frequently sent messages in a given state without dimensional alignment gave senders comparable expected payoffs (calculated based on observed strategies of other senders and receivers), with sometimes even higher payoffs for the deviating messages. For Sender 1s in pL, Dq, expected payoffs from "(left, down)", "(right, up)", and "(right, down)" were 21.33, 21.22, and 22.95 in Game 2; for Sender 1s in pR, Dq, payoffs from "(right, down)", "(right, up)", and "(left, down)" were 19.06, 22.33, and 26.08 in Game 2-LAB; for Sender 2s in pR, U q, payoffs from "(right, up)", "(left, down)", and "(right, down)" were 19.97, 16.6, and 20.66 in Game 2 and 18.19, 31.52 and 33.45 in Game 2-LAB.
Result 1b (Strategies in One-Sender Games).
• Senders in Game 1-DAL revealed on dimension H as did Sender 1s in Game 2-DAL; Senders in Game 1 behaved differently from Sender 1s in Game 2, consistent with the partially revealing equilibrium in which only pL, U q is revealed.
• Receivers in Game 1-DAL followed senders' message only on dimension H; receivers' responses in Game 1 reflected senders' revelations of pL, U q. Figure 6 presents message uses and responses in the two one-sender games. Same as Sender 1s in Game 2-DAL, senders in Game 1-DAL revealed on dimension H. In Game 1, the combined frequency of "(left, up)" and "(left, down)" was 76% in pL, U q and never exceeded 10% in the other three states, across which the uses of "(right, up)" and "(right, down)" were fairly uniform. Such message uses resulted in the revelation of pL, U q, with slight or no information provided for the other three states, consistent with the partially revealing equilibrium.
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In Game 1-DAL, receivers listened to senders on dimension H, mostly ignoring the part of messages on dimension V . In Game 1, receivers' responses to "(left, up)" and "(left, down)" were most often (left, up), largely consistent with the finding that the two messages were used to reveal pL, U q, a pattern not seen in Game 1-DAL. Under the binary message spaces, high frequencies of state identifications (76%´95%) were observed for all states. The states without dimensional/diagonal alignments were still discernable; as in Games 2 and 2-LAB, state identifications in Games 2-2/M and 2-LAB-2/M were more frequent in states with alignments than without. However, it was in the states with no alignment that restricting message spaces showed a slightly stronger effect. 31 Overall, restricting message spaces substantially brought observed outcomes in line with the prediction of fully revealing equilibrium, especially through its working on states without alignments.
Restricted Message Spaces
Result 2a (Strategies).
• Senders in two-sender games with one-dimensional messages, Games 2-2/M and 2-LAB-2/M, behaved in high accord with the prescriptions of fully revealing equilibrium, even for states without dimensional/diagonal alignment.
• Receivers in the two games virtually always followed senders' recommendations. with the prescriptions of fully revealing equilibrium were observed with 92%´99% frequencies in states with alignments. In states without alignments, adherence was observed with 79%´89% frequencies, compared to 33%´43% when four messages were available. Under the binary 31 The positive differences of Game 2-2/M over Game 2 in state identifications were 42% and 38% for pL, Dq and pR, U q and 37% and 29% for pR, Dq and pL, U q. For Games 2-LAB-2/M and 2-LAB, the differences were 41% and 40% for pR, Dq and pR, U q and 41% and 30% for pL, Dq and pL, U q. 32 Given that messages are binary, for each state we present only the frequencies of one message (truthful dimensional recommendation). For the two-dimensional message games included for comparisons, we condense the message cases accordingly. For Game 2-LAB-2/M, "main diagonal" refers to message "(left, up) or (right, down)" and "minor diagonal" to "(right, up) or (left, down)". message environment, senders' recommendations prompting for own ideal action in states without alignment could only be made on one dimension, and was very likely to be severely punished given that the other sender was recommending truthfully on the other dimension. Figure 9 substantiates that receivers' responses were highly predictable under the binary message environment. The frequencies of following senders' recommendations were at least 91% and as high as 100%. The manners in which message pairs are combined are different for Games 2-2/M and 2-LAB-2/M. In Game 2-LAB-2/M, guided by Sender 2s' dimensional messages, receivers eliminate an irrelevant component from Sender 1s' diagonal messages. In Game 2-2/M, with dimensional messages from both senders, only a simple combination of messages is required. We illustrate with our last set of findings that even such apparently simple tasks of receivers were backed by considerations of senders' incentives. shows that less frequent state identifications were observed in all three states. The omission of a state, with its robustness implication for the fully revealing equilibrium in Game 2-2/M-3/S, significantly reduced the instances receivers identify true states. 33 The measure using state-action agreements, which is presented in the lower panel, does not provide a common ground for comparing a three-state game with a four-state, in which the probability of receivers taking ideal actions out of random guess is higher in Game 2-2/M-3/S. A condition for the validity of the new measure is that the literal meanings of recommendations are used, which was observed in Game 2-2/M. 34 Same qualitative difference with statistical significance was also observed using state-action agreements, even though it favors Game 2-2/M-3/S. The frequency is 84% in Game 2-2/M, significantly higher than the 67% in Game 2-2/M-3/S (p " 0.0571, Mann-Whitney test).
Restricted
State Space: Theoretical and Empirical Implausibility
Result 3a (Strategies).
• Senders in Game 2-2/M-3/S deviated in states without dimensional alignment from the message uses observed in Game 2-2/M.
• Receivers in Game 2-2/M-3/S tended to follow senders' recommendations less often, and their responses to irreconcilable messages justified senders' deviations. Figure 11 presents senders' message uses and receivers' responses in the two games. For Sender 1s in pL, Dq, the frequency of "left" decreased from 89% in Game 2-2/M to 40% in Game 2-2/M-3/S; for Sender 2s in pR, U q, the frequency of "up" decreased from 79% to 41%. 35 Even with binary messages, the kind of deviations observed in Game 2 resurfaced in Game 2-2/M-3/S. 36 Obtained under the tight control of what messages may be received in a given instance, the finding adds force to the idea that uncertainty surrounding how receivers interpret messages that indicated inconsistency, in this case the irreconcilable ("right", "down"), was crucial to senders' adherence. It also suggests that the high adherence observed in Game 2-2/M was a result of senders getting behind the veils of message frames and acting on incentives; when receivers were likely to respond to deviating messages with attractive actions, senders deviated despite the fact that messages were framed according to the equilibrium-relevant dimensions. 35 The decreases were statistically significant for the former (p " 0.0143, Mann-Whitney test) but not for the latter (p " 0.1714, Mann-Whitney test). The insignificance was accounted for by an outlier session in Game 2-2/M-3/S; the frequencies of "up" by Sender 2s in pR, U q were 20%, 25%, 30%, and 90% in the four sessions.
36 A sender's deviation was accurately anticipated by the other sender. Figure 14 Although for message pairs ("left","up"), ("right","up"), and ("left","down") receivers in Game 2-2/M-3/S still combined and followed recommendations with high frequencies, the deviations by senders did leave a noticeable trace on receivers' responses, in which the frequencies were 4%´10% lower than those in Game 2-2/M. Receivers' responses to ("right","down") indeed presented profitable opportunities for senders to deviate. The plausible, deviation inviting responses, (right, up) and (left, down), were observed with frequencies 43% and 34%, while the implausible, deviation deterring (left, up) were observed less often with 21%, significantly lower than the threshold of 80% required to support the equilibrium (p " 0.0625, Wilcoxon signedrank test). Receivers' elicited beliefs further confirmed the implausibility of the supporting out-of-equilibrium beliefs. In the final round predictions of state, receivers in Game 2-2/M-3/S never predicted that the state was pL, U q when ("right","down") was received. 37 The theoretical implausibility of the fully revealing equilibrium in Game 2-2/M-3/S translated into a lower adherence in the laboratory, where observed behavior and elicited beliefs were consistent with the intuition behind why the equilibrium is implausible.
Concluding Remarks
Battaglini (2002) provides a pioneering equilibrium solution for how, facing experts with diverging interests, a decision maker can extract full information through cheap talk by selectively listening to them on different issues. We experiment on a series of simple games capturing Battaglini's (2002) equilibrium construction. We obtain the primary findings that, in moving away from the stringent requirement inherent in the notion of equilibrium, messages spaces play an important role for full revelation.
Our findings suggest policy implications regarding institutions for eliciting information: in a multidimensional environment with multiple experts, even when talk is otherwise cheap and cannot be verified, decision makers may still effectively elicit information if institutions are in place to restrict what experts can say on what issues. Extrapolated from this is that decision makers' opportunity to commit to what to listen to and from whom, while theoretically having no impact in light of Battaglini's (2002) equilibrium, may have an effect in practice. As one of the first experimental studies on this topic, we use a parsimonious design which allows us to, among others, identify in a stark setting the effects of message spaces in information aggregation. Before experimentalists can "whisper in the ears of Princes" (Roth, 1995) with a more comprehensive picture on the issue, more experimental efforts will be needed, and we hope that our study will contribute to initiate more inquiries on this important topic. 37 Figure 15 in Appendix C presents the receivers' predictions in all games.
15 ě 60, which is not satisfied. Next, consider a partially revealing equilibrium in which only dimension V is revealed. When V " U is revealed, the receiver's best response to the updated beliefs µ LU " µ RU " 1 2 and µ LD " µ RD " 0 is to randomize between (left, up) and (right, up) with probabilities pp, 1´pq for any p P r0, 1s. When V " D is revealed, the receiver's best response to the updated beliefs µ LU " µ RU " 0 and µ LD " µ RD " 1 2 is to randomize between (left, down) and (right, down) with probabilities pq, 1´qq for any q P r0, 1s. For senders in states pL, U q and pR, U q, equilibrium requires, respectively, 20p ě 50q`10p1´qq and 20p1´pq ě 10q`50p1´qq, which implies 20 ě 60, a contradiction. Finally, we show that the diagonal partition ttpL, U q, pR, Dqu, tpR, U q, pL, Dquu is not consistent with equilibrium. When the main diagonal tpL, U q, pR, Dqu is revealed, the receiver's best response to the updated beliefs µ LU " µ RD " 1 2 and µ RU " µ LD " 0 is to randomize between (left, up) and (right, down) with probabilities pp, 1´pq for any p P r0, 1s. When the minor diagonal tpR, U q, pL, Dqu is revealed, the receiver's best response to the updated beliefs µ LU " µ RD " 0 and µ RU " µ LD " 1 2 is to randomize between (right, up) and (left, down) with probabilities pq, 1´qq for any q P r0, 1s. For senders in states pL, U q and pR, Dq, equilibrium requires, respectively, 20p`10p1´pq ě 50p1´qq and 10p`20p1´pq ě 50q, which implies 30 ě 50, a contradiction.
It is straightforward that the fully revealing partition ttpL, U qu, tpL, Dqu, tpR, U qu, tpR, Dquu cannot be sustained as equilibrium. It suffices to consider state pL, U q in which the sender has an incentive to tell that it is pL, Dq given that he will receive 50 rather than 20. To complete the proof, we rule out the 1´1´2 partitions. There are six possible partitions in this category. The two partitions in which V is fully revealed for fixed values of H are also not feasible in equilibrium, because the sender shares no common interest with the receiver along dimension V . For each of the remaining four partitions, since when the state is one of the partially revealed ones the sender has an incentive to tell that it is one of the fully revealed ones, for this yields him a payoff of 50 or 60, they also cannot be feasible in equilibrium.
Game 1-DAL. For receiver's beliefs µ " pµ LU , µ LD , µ RU , µ RD q where µ HV is the probability assigned to state pH, V q P tL, RuˆtU, Du, U R pa|µq is the expected payoff from taking action a given beliefs µ. Then, U R ppleft, upq|µq " 50µ LU`2 0µ RD , U R ppright, upq|µq " 50µ RU`2 0µ LD , U R ppleft, downq|µqq " 50µ LD`2 0µ RU , and U R ppright, downq|µq " 50µ RD`2 0µ LU .
We first show the existence of the partially revealing equilibrium. Suppose the sender truthfully reveals H " L and babbles on dimension V . The receiver's best response to her updated beliefs µ LU " µ LD " 1 2 and µ RU " µ RD " 0 (from the uniform prior) is to randomize between (left, up) and (left, down) with probabilities pp, 1´pq, p P r0, 1s. Consider next that the sender truthfully reveals H " R and babbles on dimension V . The receiver's best response to the updated beliefs µ RU " µ RD " 1 2 and µ LU " µ LD " 0 is to randomize between (right, up) and (right, down) with probabilities pq, 1´qq, q P r0, 1s. In state pL, U q, we require that the sender has no incentive to tell that the state consists of R, or 20p`50p1´pq ě 10p1´qq, which is satisfied for all p P r0, 1s and all q P r0, 1s. Similarly, it is straightforward that for all p P r0, 1s and all q P r0, 1s, the sender has no incentive to deviate in states pR, U q, pL, Dq and pR, Dq.
We show that there exists no equilibrium in Game 1-dom with other information partitions. It is straightforward that the fully revealing partition ttpL, U qu, tpL, Dqu, tpR, U qu, tpR, Dquu cannot be sustained as equilibrium, for a sender in state pL, U q would have an incentive to tell that it is pL, Dq given that he will receive 50 rather than 20. Consider next the 1´3 partition where only pL, U q is fully revealed. In all other states, the receiver's best response to the updated beliefs µ LD " µ RU " µ RD " 1 3 and µ LU " 0 is to randomize between (left, down) and (right, up) with probabilities pp, 1´pq, p P r0, 1s. This does not constitute an equilibrium, because a sender in state pL, Dq has an incentive to tell that it is pL, U q so the receiver takes (left, up), given that 50 ą 20p`10p1´pq for all p P r0, 1s. Similar arguments hold for all other 1-3 partitions.
We show next that other 2-2 partitions cannot constitute an equilibrium. Consider the partition where dimension V is fully revealed. When V " U is revealed, the receiver's best response to the updated beliefs µ LU " µ RU " 1 2 and µ LD " µ RD " 0 is to randomize between (left, up) and (right, up) with probabilities pp, 1´pq for some p P r0, 1s. When V " D is revealed, The receiver's best response to the updated beliefs µ LU " µ RU " 0 and µ LD " µ RD " 1 2 is to randomize between (left, down) and (right, down) with probabilities pq, 1´qq for some q P r0, 1s. For senders in states pL, U q and pR, U q, equilibrium requires, respectively, 20p ě 50q`10p1´qq and 20p1´pq ě 10q`50p1´qq, which implies 20 ě 60, a contradiction. For the partition ttpL, U q, pR, Dqu, tpL, Dq, pR, U quu in which the diagonal is revealed, a similar argument shows that for senders in states pL, U q and pR, Dq, equilibrium requires, respectively, 50q ď 20p`10p1´pq and 50p1´qq ď 10p`20p1´pq, which leads to the contradiction of 50 ď 30.
We complete the proof by ruling out the six 1-1-2 partitions. By the same argument against the fully revealing partition, the two partitions in which H is fully revealed for fixed values of V cannot be sustained in equilibrium. The two other partitions in which V is fully revealed for fixed values of H are also not feasible in equilibrium, because the sender shares no common interest with the receiver along dimension V . This leaves partitions ttpL, U q, pR, Dqu, tpL, Dqu, tpR, U quu and ttpL, U qu, tpR, Dqu, tpL, Dq, pR, U quu. However, senders in one of two partially revealed states have an incentive to tell that it is the fully revealed state that yields him a payoff of 50.
Proof of Proposition 2. Game 2 and 2-DAL existence. We construct a fully revealing equilibrium in which Sender 1 truthfully reveals on dimension H and Sender 2 on dimension V . To economize on notations, we denote ph˚, v˚q to be the receiver's ideal action in state pH, V q P tL, RuˆtU, Du. Consider the following senders' strategy profiles for all pH, V q P tL, RuˆtU, Du, in which Sender 1 truthfully reveals on dimension H but is not required to truthfully reveal on dimension V and Sender 2 does the exact opposite. The receiver's best responses are her ideal actions ρp"ph˚, v 1 q", "ph 1 , v˚q"q " ph˚, v˚q, because her updated beliefs (using Bayes' rule) are: For any v 1 P tup, downu and h 1 P tleft, rightu,
since either σ 1 p"ph˚, v 1 q"|pH,Ṽ" 0 or σ 2 p"ph 1 , v˚q"|pH,Ṽ" 0 unless pH,Ṽ q " pH, V q.
To verify that (A.1) constitutes an equilibrium, note that given the strategies of Sender 2 and the receiver, Sender 1 can only influence the receiver in the choice between ph˚, v˚q and ph, v˚q, h˚‰h; it is straightforward to verify that Sender 1 strictly prefers ph˚, v˚q over ph, v˚q. Similarly, Sender 2, given the others' strategies, can only influence the receiver in the choice between ph˚, v˚q and ph˚,ṽq where he strictly prefers ph˚, v˚q over ph˚,ṽq. Other than (A.1), there is no restriction on σ 1 p"ph˚, upq"|pH, V qq, σ 1 p"ph˚, downq"|pH, V qq, σ 2 p"pleft, v˚q"|pH, Vand σ 2 p"pright, v˚q"|pH, V qq. If σ 1 p"ph˚, v˚q"|pH, V" σ 2 p"ph˚, v˚q"|pH, V" 1, we obtain the third class of fully revealing equilibrium. The receiver's response after receiving an out-ofequilibrium inconsistent message pair can be assigned to be one of the equilibrium responses, which suffice to deter deviations. If σ 1 p"ph˚, upq"|pH, Vą 0, σ 1 p"ph˚, downq"|pH, Vą 0, σ 2 p"pleft, v˚q"|pH, Vą 0 and σ 2 p"pright, v˚q"|pH, Vą 0, we obtain the first class of fully revealing equilibrium, in which there is no out-of-equilibrium message pair.
Game 2 non-diagonal. Here we prove the non-existence of diagonal fully revealing equilibria for Game 2. If Sender 1 reveals partition ttpL, U q, pR, Dqu, tpR, U q, pL, Dquu, Sender 2 in state pR, U q has an incentive to tell that the state is "D" (or "L") to induce action (left, down). If Sender 2 reveals partition ttpL, U q, pR, Dqu, tpR, U q, pL, Dquu, Sender 1 in state pL, Dq has an incentive to tell that the state is "U" (or "R") to induce action (right, up).
Game 2-LAB existence & non-diagonal. Omitted as Game 2-LAB is a relabeling of Game 2.
Game 2-DAL diagonal. For the second class of fully revealing equilibrium in which Sender 1 reveals between diagonals and Sender 2 reveals on dimension V , the receiver's best response (to the updated beliefs) is to take her ideal action ρp"ph˚, v˚q or ph,ṽq", "ph 1 , v˚q"q " ph˚, v˚q for h˚‰h and v˚‰ṽ. Given the strategies of Sender 1 and the receiver, Sender 2 can only influence the receiver in the choice between ph˚, v˚q and ph,ṽq, but he strictly prefers ph˚, v˚q over ph,ṽq. Similarly, Sender 1, given the others' strategies, can only influence the receiver in the choice between ph˚, v˚q and ph, v˚q where he strictly prefers ph˚, v˚q over ph, v˚q. For the last class of fully revealing equilibrium in which Sender 1 reveals on dimension H and Sender 2 reveals between diagonals, the receiver's best response (to the updated beliefs) is to take her ideal action ρp"ph˚, v 1 q", "ph˚, v˚q or ph,ṽq"q " ph˚, v˚q for h˚‰h and v˚‰ṽ. Given the strategies of Sender 1 and the receiver, Sender 2 can only influence the receiver in the choice between ph˚, v˚q and ph˚,ṽq, v˚‰ṽ, but he strictly prefers ph˚, v˚q over ph˚,ṽq. Similarly, Sender 1, given the others' strategies, can only influence the receiver in the choice between ph˚, v˚q and ph,ṽq, h˚‰h and v˚‰ṽ, where he strictly prefers ph˚, v˚q over ph,ṽq.
Proof of Proposition 3. With the binary message spaces the senders' strategy profiles in (A.1) become σ 1 p"h"|pH, V" σ 2 p"v"|pH, V" 1. The receiver updates her beliefs in a similar fashion as in (A.2), and her best response is ρp"h", "v"q " ph, vq. Similar to the argument in the proof of Proposition 2, the senders' strategies also constitute best responses. There are two other classes of strategy profiles to achieve full revelation: 1) Sender 1 truthfully revealing on dimension V and Sender 2 on dimension H, and 2) one sender truthfuly reveals on the diagonal, and the other sender reveals on either dimension V or dimension H. It is straightforward to verify that neither of these strategy profile can constitute an equilibrium. Given that under the binary message spaces there is no out-of-equilibrium message pair for any fully revealing equilibrium, the receiver's beliefs are always derived from Bayes' rule.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider, σ 1 p"h"|pH, V" σ 2 p"v"|pH, V" 1, where the receiver's best response is ρp"h", "v"q " ph, vq. It is straightforward that in state pL, U q no sender has an incentive to deviate, so we specify the receiver's response to a irreconcilable message pair to ensure non-deviation in states pR, U q and pL, Dq. Given the receiver's beliefs µ " pµ LU , µ LD , µ RU q, her expected payoffs are U R ppleft, upq|µq " 50µ LU`2 0pµ RU`µLD q, U R ppright, upq|µq " 20µ LU5 0µ RU , U R ppleft, downq|µqq " 10µ LU`5 0µ LD , and U R ppright, downq|µq " 10pµ RU`µLD q. For any µ, U R ppright, downq|µq ă U R ppleft, upq|µq. Thus, (right, down) is strictly dominated. Let the receiver take (left, up), (right, up) and (left, down) with respective probabilities p, q and 1´p´q after receiving an irreconcilable message pair. Then, Sender 1s in state pL, Dq will have no incentive to tell that the state consists of R only if 20 ě 15p`60q`20p1´p´qq or p ě 8q. Sender 2s in state pR, U q will have no incentive to tell that the state consists of D only if 20 ě 15p`20q`60p1´p´qq or 9p`8q ě 8. Combining p ě 8q and 9p`8q ě 8, we obtain p ě 4 5 as required. Similar to Game 2-2/M, other classes of strategy profiles to achieve full revelation cannot constitute an equilibrium so that σ 1 p"h"|pH, V" σ 2 p"v"|pH, V" 1 represent the unique strategy profiles that does.
Proof of Corollary 1. To support the fully revealing equilibrium, the receiver's strategy after an irreconcilable message pair needs to put probability of at least Appendix B -Translated Instruction for Game 2
TASSEL EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTION Experimental Payment
At the end of the experiment, you will receive a show-up fee of NT$100 plus the NTD converted from the "Standard Currency Units" you have earned in the experiment. ("Standard Currency Units" are the experimental currency units used in the experiment.) The amount of "Standard Currency Units" you will receive, which will be different for each participant, depends on your decision, the decision of others and some random factor. All earnings are paid in private and you are not obligated to tell others how much you have earned.
Note: The exchange rate between "Standard Currency Units" and NTD is 2 : 1. 
Experimental Instructions
This is an experiment on group decisions among three individuals. There are 3 practice rounds and 50 official rounds. Each group consists of three members, Member A, B and C. At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned by the computer to be either A, B, or C. Once decided, your role remains the same throughout the experiment. However, at the beginning of each round, the computer will randomly rematch participants to form new groups; thus, members in your group are not the same each round.
At the beginning of each round, the computer will randomly select the current state out of four possibilities: pL, U q, pR, U q, pL, Dq and pR, Dq. Member A and Member B will be informed about the selected current state (displayed on their screens) but not Member C. In each round, Member C will have to make a decision, choosing (left, up), (right, up), (left, down) or (right, down).
Before Member C makes the decision, Member A and Member B will both recommend "left" or "right" and "up" or "down". Member A will first recommend "left" or "right" and then "up" or "down"; Member B will recommend "up" or "down" and then "left" or "right". Recommendations will be displayed on Member C's screen only after all the recommendations have been made by both Member A and Member B, after which Member C makes the decision. For example, the decision screen of Member C is displayed here, in which Member A has recommended "left", "down" and Member B has recommended "right", "up". 38 In each round, each member's earnings depend on the current state and Member C's decision, as in the table displayed on the screen. Your earnings are bold in blue and those of the other two members 38 The experimental instructions were accompanied by slide illustrations showing screen shots in Appendix D. are in black (italic or underlined). If you are Member A and Member B, the current state will further be highlighted in red. There are four regions in the table, the top-left region shows the earnings when the current state is pL, U q, and the top-right shows the earnings when the current state is pR, U q. Similarly, Similarly for other three states.
At the end of each round, the computer will display results of the round, including the current state, Member A's and Member B's recommendations, Member C's decision and your earnings. Click "Confirm" to proceed to the next round.
In addition, in some rounds you will be asked to make some "predictions." Please follow the instructions on the screen. If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and the experimenter will come to answer.
Practice Rounds
There are three practice rounds, where the objective is to get you familiar with the computer interface and the earnings calculation. Please note that the practice rounds are entirely for this purpose, and any earnings in the practice rounds will not contribute to your final payment at all. Once the practice rounds are over, the experimenter will announce "The official experiment begins now!" after which the official experiment starts.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The experimenter will answer your question individually.
The Official Experiment Begins
The official experiment begins now. There are in total 50 rounds. The Standard Currency Units you earn in all 50 rounds will be converted into NTD and paid to you according to the 2 : 1 exchange rate (2 Standard Currency Units = NT$1). So, please make your decisions carefully. Note: For Game 2-2/M and 2-2/M-3/S, "ph, .q" is used for "h" and "p., vq" for "v". pH, V qÔOE"ph, vq" represents diagonal agreements. The numbers in bold indicate equilibrium-relevant dimensions. 
